5
Although not explicitly examined in all of these studies, an assumption is that such beneficial cross- The extant literature provides a strong foundation for considering the important distinction 13 between formal mandatory, often in fact automated, exchanges and more discretionary sharing 
17
The focus of such past studies has been on broadly cultural and somewhat unilateral representations of 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 stronger effect on knowledge sharing attempts when they are constraining than when they are not. functions. According to this framework, a functions' voluntary knowledge sharing is dependent not only 22 on its ability, but also on its motivation and opportunity to share.
23
Second, we hold a bilateral view of cross-functional knowledge exchange; a view that emerges 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 perspectives. This is unprecedented yet eminently logical for management practice. As one of our COO 2 interviewees put it, "our sales and production departments clearly have different mindsets and different 3 responsibilities; and their understanding of the firm's overall objectives and that of the importance of 4 customers also differ." As a result our theoretical model accounts for MOA antecedents as well as 5 performance outcomes of the two sides of knowledge sharing. In this model, Opportunity, representing 6 the environmental or contextual mechanisms that enable voluntary knowledge exchange to occur, can 7 be viewed as a largely shared factor (e.g., cross-functional rotation and training, and joint attendance at 
11
To test this theoretical model, we collected survey data on the Sales-Production interface from operations management, by suggesting that the constraining factors in motivation and ability to 19 exchange knowledge across the production-to-sales and sales-to-production interface are asymmetric: 20 different departments have different drivers for knowledge sharing. Our study thus provides specific 21 suggestions for the theory and practice of improving production-sales knowledge exchange. 
Theory and Hypotheses

23
This study focuses on knowledge exchange between functional units that is incidental, non-24 compulsory, and beyond the scope of routine day-to-day interactions; i.e., what we refer to here as 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 the role of opportunity as a third pivotal element on which action and work performance was contingent.. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 At the center of the model is the adequacy of knowledge voluntarily exchanged from one 12 function to another. We define "adequacy" of knowledge exchanged as sufficient and satisfactory, as 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32 priorities. When one function does not understand the priorities of the other, it is unlikely that they will
25
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10
have the ability to make effective exchanges (Lovejoy and Ying, 2002).
11
As examples, consider the following two scenarios witnessed in practice. Following a meeting in 12 which market share loss was emphasized, a firm's Production function develops the impression that
13
Sales has been particularly charged with finding opportunities to increase customer satisfaction. We furthermore presume that differences in awareness of this type likely exist between 3 production and sales functions. This stems largely from the nature of the Production-Sales-customer 4 connections. In make-to-stock or make-to-order settings, such as those we will be investigating, the first 5 line of communications with customers is Sales. The sales function has the most immediate visibility 6 into consumer demands and how its own actions, and the effectiveness of those of Production, impacts 7 that demand. In these settings, such information is typically imperfectly filtered through Sales before 
Knowledge Exchange and Higher Level Performance
19
Exchanges that are adequate, with regards to fulfilling the specific contextual needs of a given 
10
As a still finer point, it is not a foregone conclusion that knowledge exchange, even if deemed 11 adequate by production and sales functions, will be perfectly aligned with higher level organizational the benefits of IT-driven exchange capability). As a result, each function may be willing to take informed 18 actions with empirically observable distinctions concerning their impact on higher level performance.
19
We therefore pose two parallel but distinct hypotheses as below. 
Data and Methods
23
As part of a more comprehensive examination of the industry in that region this study is based 24 on data collected from electronics manufacturers registered in Guangdong Province, China. According 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 http://www.gdstats.gov.cn).
5
Historically, electronics manufacturers in Guangdong depended heavily on exports and mass 6 standardized production outnumbered small-scaled customized production. Research and development 7 functions were usually undertaken in developed countries. Financial success mainly owed to cheap 8 labor and environmental costs as well as an undervalued local currency. However, the business 9 environment has changed drastically in the past decade. First, more strict environmental and labor laws To qualify for consideration in our study, each firm needed to satisfy three conditions: (1) it 21 possessed both production and sales departments; (2) had no less than 100 employees; and (3) was 22 profitable in the year of 2011. Sampling firms from a single industry and located in the same geo-23 cultural area, our goal was to help control for potentially unobserved heterogeneity. This allowed us to 24 study effects of differences in organizational policy and activity across firms without having to account 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
Preliminary Interviews and Piloting
11
Prior to the main survey, we conducted one to three-hour interviews with 27 managers from 12 nine firms of various sizes in a targeted population (not part of our main sample). 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 We targeted two subgroups of electronics manufacturers registered in Guangdong Province.
2
The first subgroup consisted of 58 public firms listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges. 3 We contacted all 58 firms and the final response rate was 56.9%. The second subgroup consisted of 4 private firms registered by the provincial tax agency. We randomly selected 1/6 of these firms (421 in 5 total) to contact and the final response rate was 35.6%. For each firm we elicited, we identified a 6 contact and sent three survey packages to that contact (e.g. secretary of the board of directors or the 7 chief accountant). The contact then distributed the survey packages to the corresponding managers.
8
After the surveys were completed, the respondents each individually mailed the surveys back to one of 9 the authors in self-addressed envelopes. To increase response, we followed the survey implementation four weeks later, and phoning a week after sending out the replacements.
13
We received in total 556 responses, out of which we created 183 complete firm records. We 14 identified one firm as outlier due to normality issues and incomplete answers, and excluded it from the 15 following analysis. Out of the 182 firms102 voluntarily provided financial data while 78 (all of which were 16 private firms) did not. We subsequently obtained their financial data from the provincial tax agency. Based on the preliminary interviews, we identified both routine and non-routine or voluntary 11 knowledge items that were commonly exchanged between the production and sales departments and 
17
22
In responding to the survey, production and sales managers were asked to rate the adequacy 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 We used three items to measure the extent to which frequent interactions between the two 8 functions were institutionalized. Specifically, production and sales managers rated on 7-point Likert To minimize response bias, we adopted a relatively "objective" approach, adapted from We structured Controllability of Performance using the sum product of weight assigned to the 
11
Furthermore, managers usually have major influence or control over their subordinates' behaviors.
12
Thus, the motivation of functional managers should critical shape the motivation of the entire function. 
Ability -(Lack of) Awareness about Other Function's Priorities
14
Based on the interviews, we identified lists of key priorities common to the two departments in 15 our firm population (e.g., hiring, training, and retaining employees for production managers and entering 16 new markets for sales managers). These lists were provided in the survey. From the lists, production 17 and sales managers were asked to identify and rank the top three priorities for their own department 18 and then for the other department. The priority ranking for production department by the production of functions to be aware of the types of knowledge needed to achieve the other function's valued goals. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Presumably, the higher a function's awareness about the other's work priorities, the more capable it is to 1 provide useful information. We argue that this overall measure of awareness held by the function's 2 managerial lead is an adequate proxy for at least the upper limit of collective ability in this regard for the Based on the preliminary interviews, we identified seven dimensions that are deemed important 6 in assessing operational performance in our firm population: (1) Flexibility in responding to customers' 7 specific needs, (2) Customer satisfaction and loyalty, (3) Cost saving and efficiency, (4) On-time 8 delivery, (5) Defect rate, (6) Innovation, and (7) Capacity management. In the survey, the executive 9 respondents rated the firms' performance relative to the industry average along these seven dimensions 10 on 7-point Likert scales (1: Significantly below average; 7: Leader of the Industry). EFA results suggest 11 that all except one dimension (i.e., defect rate) loaded significantly on one factor and the lowest factor 12 loading was 0.59. The executives also rated the overall operational performance. With the exception of 13 defect rate, the six dimensions correlated significantly with this overall rating (ρ>0.41). To measure 14 Operational Performance, we thus excluded the rating on defect rate and used the sum score of the 15 other six dimensions (Cronbach's α=0.79). 
25
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Control Variables
22
Bigger firms tend to have more resources to promote voluntary cross-functional knowledge 23 exchange, which may result in greater opportunity and ability for such knowledge exchange. However, 24 exchange is also likely to be stifled by the bureaucracy commonly seen in bigger organizations. scale (e.g., the external environment is "very risky, one false step can mean the firm's undoing") and P2S and t=6.94, p<0.01 for S2P). However, a significant number of managers gave low ratings to the 15 adequacy of certain knowledge items (e.g. 25% of the sales and 30% of the production managers rated 16 the adequacy of "strategic and long-term issues related" knowledge received to be lower than 4).
Analysis and Results
11
17
[Insert Table 3 assess the model fit.
18
We estimated the theoretical model based on the structure depicted in Figure 1 . Aside from the 19 path coefficients used to test the hypotheses, we also estimated the following control links: the paths 20 from three control variables (i.e., Size, Environmental Uncertainty, and Customization) to both 21 1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for his/her insights on this issue. 2 Our analysis shows that compared with firms that self-reported financial data, those firms that the tax agent provided financial data on had a lower profit margin on average (F-ratio=3.36, p=0.07). Also, firms that the tax agent provided data on also had an even lower correlation between subjective operational performance and profit margin (ρ = 0.07, p = 0.55). This suggests that firms in our sample may have the tendency to under-report their profitability due to concerns for tax burdens. 3 Although we build on the argumentation by Siemsen et al. (2008) about constraining factors, we used basic linear model to test our hypotheses. Moreover, as per a reviewer's suggestion, in our online supplement, we also present regression analyses results in predicting P2S and S2P knowledge-sharing. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 regression coefficients estimated from this model (see Figure 2 and Table 5 ) to test the hypotheses.
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7
[Insert Table 5 and Figure 2 here]
8
Institutionalized Interaction, the measure of opportunity, has significant effect on both P2S 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The present study demonstrates that the MOA framework is proving both theoretically and empirically 6 useful for understanding cross-functional knowledge sharing. This is because the MOA antecedents in 7 our study together explain a significant portion of the variance in knowledge sharing between Sales and 8 Production. However, based on our analyses, we propose two critical extensions to this framework. First, we find that the MOA antecedents differ in their contribution to accounting for variance in 10 knowledge sharing depending on whose MOA antecedents we are talking about; Sales's or 11 Production's. This is an important contrast to previous applications of MOA in which the specific MOA knowledge. Second, we find that the MOA antecedents in our study are more important, or in other 17 words deterministic for knowledge sharing, when they are at a comparatively lower level than when they 
The Role of Ability in Production's Voluntary Information Exchange
21
In our study we operationalize ability to capture how well a particular function is equipped to 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 particular, Sales' perceived controllability is lower than Production's.
19
Reflecting on this insight further, we argue that the controllability difference between Sales and
20
Production is also confirmed by our observation that Sales tend to have more outward-looking 21 objectives while Production more internally-focused perspective. Among most firms we interviewed, the 22 sales and production managers identified rather different strategic foci of their firms. Specifically, we
23
asked them what they believed to be the strategic foci of their firm in the upcoming year or two. The 24 sales managers tended to identify outward-looking objectives: e.g., enlarging customer bases, 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 utilize knowledge exchanged between functions, which we do not measure directly in the current study. 
Implications for Practice
17
This study provides new insights into the differential drivers of cross-functional voluntary 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 We chose a Chinese sample in response to a call for more research evidence from China from 
One might posit that a more collectivist culture might be more likely to accentuate cross-functional 18 knowledge exchanges. However, there is some speculation that in collectivist cultures such as China,
19
identification with a collective such as one's work function can stymie cross-functional interaction 20 (Triandis, 1989) ; however more research is needed to examine our insights further in a cross-cultural 21 context.
22
We also note bias in our data towards managers that perceive higher levels of control over their 23 functional performance. While this more aptly represents our practitioner audience than would the 24 converse, it nevertheless limits the robust generalizability of our findings. Our focus in this study also 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Moreover, in our path models, the error terms associated with the two knowledge adequacy measures 3 were correlated (ρ=0.17, p=0.04), which suggests that unknown common third variables (e.g., benefit from concentrating efforts on increasing their production teams' ability to exchange knowledge.
21
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